Piece Work Pay and Hourly Pay over the Cycle * This paper investigates the relative cyclical behavior of the pay of piece workers and hourly paid workers. It uses a unique data set of blue-collar workers in British engineering between 1926 and 1966. The statistics are obtained from the payrolls of firms belonging to the Engineering Employers Federation (EEF). Roughly, the EEF accounted for one-third of the total engineering workforce. The data consist of cell averages delineated by 15 occupations in 29 engineering districts. Via a firm-union bargaining modelling structure, the question is examined as to likely earnings responses to price shocks under the two payment systems. The empirical work entails testing for cyclical differences in the two payments methods Insights are gained from distinguishing between the relatively tight post-war and slack prewar labor markets.
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Introduction
Over the past two decades researchers have found evidence of strong wage procyclicality. In most cases, this has been measured in terms of wage -unemployment trade-offs.
1 But the picture is not clear cut. Based on U.S. data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Devereux (2001) finds relatively modest overall wage procyclicality. His study differentiates among salaried and hourly paid workers as well as workers whose pay is directly related to current output. Forms of remuneration for this last group comprise "piece rates, commissions, tips, and in other ways". Hourly earnings linked directly to current output (such as piece rates) are found by Devereux to be significantly more procyclical than those of hourly paid or salaried workers. However, the group of individuals receiving piece rates/commissions etc. in the PSID is relatively small and so Devereux is very cautious about this relative finding.
Since output-related pay is likely to correlate positively with productivity and product demand, we might expect a priori an especially strong positive association between piece rate pay and the level of business activity. This paper attempts to examine the question of cyclical movements in incentive pay and time-related pay in more depth.
It concentrates on the two types of remuneration of blue collar workers in the British engineering industry between 1926 and 1966. These are earnings based on piece rates and on hourly rates. Data are compiled from the annual payroll records of the Engineering Employers Federation (EEF). In the early 1950s, total engineering 1 Following the study of Bils (1985) , empirical research has been dominated by the use of individual-level panels. Findings of strong cyclicality include Solon et al. (1994) and Shin (1994) for the United States, Bellmann and Blien (2001) for Germany, Devereux and Hart (2006) and Hart (2006) for the U.K. While inevitable caveats arise in these studies, they are all reasonably consistent with an emerging stylized fact that a one point increase in the rate of unemployment is associated with a one percent decrease in the wage.
2 employment accounted for about one seventh of Britain's working population (Knowles and Hill, 1954) . Federated engineering firms accounted for about one-third of this total.
The payroll statistics used here cover roughly 40 percent of the EEF employment. They consist of cell averages of 15 engineering occupational groups within 29 engineering geographical districts over a 40-year time span. Matching district unemployment rates are also available.
The engineering industry in general and, especially, the EEF were heavily unionized. Accordingly, the paper starts by investigating piece-and hours-related pay reactions to price or productivity shocks within a firm-union bargaining framework.
Linked to modeling outcomes, pay cyclicality is subsequently tested under two unemployment regimes. In tight post-war labor markets, with relatively little short-term scope to change the size of the firm's employment stock, significant increases in production are more likely to stem from increases in the hours and effort of existing workers. Earnings increases directly rewarded existing employees for this greater work intensity as well as compensating them for increased work disutility. In slack pre-war market conditions, changes in union utility was strongly influenced by rises and falls in employed union membership with earnings' effects becoming less clear cut.
The EEF data offer a number of comparative empirical advantages. First, they contain large samples of both piece-rate and hourly paid workers and so provide serious insights into cyclicality by these two radically different payment methods. Second, by straddling the period of the Great Depression, they enable us to obtain evidence derived from the most pronounced and unequivocal business cycle. Third, they cover a fairly homogeneous group of workers so that any observed differences by method of pay are 3 less likely to be spuriously caused by differences in worker characteristics. Fourth, unlike earlier studies that examine pre-war wage cyclicality, the data permit the use of modern micro methods to study cyclicality. This enables comparison with findings of studies using more recent data. Fifth, hours' fluctuations, and associated variations in the importance of overtime pay, are important features of engineering blue collar jobs and so the data helps cast a sharp light on the role of working time in earnings cycles (see Abowd and Card, 1989 , Devereux, 2001 , Shin and Solon, 2004 . Sixth, the data offer a stringent test of whether the common finding of strong wage procyclicality is time invariant or just relevant to recent decades. For example, on the basis of industry-level data for the U.S., Bernanke and Powell (1986) find that post-war wage procyclicality contrasts, typically, with countercyclical real wages in the pre-war period (see also Bernanke, 1986) .
Section 2 outlines firm-union bargaining outcomes under piece-and time-related payment systems. Section 3 contains a description and discussion of EEF and related data. Section 4 lays out the approach to estimating pay -unemployment cyclicality.
Results are presented in Section 5. Brief conclusions are drawn-up in Section 6.
Payment methods, firm-union bargaining, and price shocks
Union agreements formed an important part of pay settlements within EEF member firms. Discussion here focuses on a firm-union bargaining agenda that includes pay (either piece-or time-related), work intensity (defined by hours and effort), and employment. Embracing both pay and work intensity also reflects the framework of most of the empirical cyclical pay literature listed in the introduction (see Foonote 1). During the study period, engineering unions cared not only about pay and other internal work 4 conditions but also about the proportion union members who were employed. 2 I focus on piece-and time-rate reactions to price shocks within an efficient bargaining framework.
Consider an engineering firm that produces homogeneous output, Q, and chooses to operate under either a piece rate system or an hourly pay system. 3 Workers belong to a single union. The union also represents outside unemployed workers. It is assumed that the union is risk neutral.
The firm's production function is given by
where N is the workforce, h is average hours, and e is average work effort.
The firm's profit is given by
where p is product price, Y is earnings, z is the per-worker cost of monitoring performance, with earnings relating either to a piece rate system (P) or an hourly pay system (H). For simplicity, I assume fixed and predetermined per-worker expenditures by the firm on monitoring.
How are the two payments methods differentiated?
Following Pencavel (1977) , let the output or performance of a piece rate worker be indexed by Φ. Let the level of Φ be determined by the number of hours worked and the effort expended on that work. Then we may express piece-related earnings as
where τ is the piece rate.
Earnings based on paid-for hours may be expressed simply as Lazear, 1986) with the latter implicitly assumed here to be a function of work application or effort. So, for given h and τ in (3), a pieceworker can earn more one week compared to another week by increasing current output and/or by ensuring that a larger proportion of output achieves a laid-down quality standard. By contrast, the hourly pay of a time worker is typically fixed by a short term contractual agreement. Of course, productive effort may vary and impact on output -as expressed in equation (1) (1977) , "supervisory personnel are used to reduce shirking by workers on time-rates while with payment-by-results systems more resources are devoted to inspect the quality of output…."
The trade union has M members of whom M -N are unemployed and receive b unemployment benefit. The union's objective function is given by
where we assume that a worker's disutility is separable in income and the disutility of 
The union's rent is R = V -U. The risk assumption allows us to express rent simply in terms of net income. Thus
The generalised Nash bargain is given by
where α is relative union power, with
From the first-order conditions to the problem in (7), the union's share of rent is 
As an initial simplification, suppose that changes in effort have no effect on individual and aggregate output (i.e.
in (3) and (1), respectively). This may be a plausible assumption in respect of the work environment of many engineering workers. First, the use of automatic machinery may serve to regulate and control the rate of work flow. Second, engineering work linked to line production may remove individuals' abilities to influence the rate of production throughput. Third, team work may severely restrict individual control of work rate when output stems from interdependent inputs across team members. It should be added, however, that discounting effort effects in these ways is a much more plausible assumption in a time work compared to a piece work environment. Tightly controlling individuals' abilities to vary output as well as involvement in team-reliant production are operational features that detract from the use of piece rate systems (Fama, 1991). 6 Imposing this effort restriction effectively reduces the problem to that of a workers-hours efficient bargaining model (see Hart and Moutos, 1995; pp. 119-121) .
Even with this simpler problem, however, it is not possible to sign unambiguously the 8 reactions of employment or hours or earnings to price changes. In essence, a positive price shock will result in increases in production and profit. But increased factor input may take the form of a rise in employment or hours or both. The union's payoff also rises, but this can take the form of a rise in employed membership and/or a rise in earnings. In fact, a significant rise in one these utility-related variables may accompany a fall in the other.
Retaining the assumption of no association between effort changes and output, two additional restrictions do lead to more clear cut outcomes. First, in respect of (4), let hours be fixed at h = h s (and disutility at equivalent d = d s ). The firm and the union may have a long-term agreement that workers operate on maximum basic weekly hours. 7 The modified problem in (7) now yields 0 / > dp dN and = dp dY J / < > 0. 8 A favorable price shock induces the firm to increase production which, in this special case, is limited to an increase in workforce size. From (6), the union's rent is enhanced. Whether or not the union additionally gains through an increase in the wage is not certain. 9 Second, suppose that employment is fixed at N = N . Similar developments to the above produce dh/dp > 7 Maximum basic weekly hours where negotiated at national level and applied generally to British engineering over the period of study. Between 1919 and 1946 the basic workweek was 47 hours. It reduced to 44 hours from 1947 to 1959, to 42 hours between 1960 and 1964, and to 40 hours between 1965 and 1968. 8 Take the example of time payments, with Y H = w in (4) and with h = h s = 1 by choice of units. Totally differentiating the first-order conditions to this problem yields 0 / / > ∆ = N F dp dN N and = dp dw /
It also holds that dN/db < 0 and dw/db > 0, or a fall in unemployment benefit persuades the union to trade-off more employed members at lower pay. Also we find that dN/dz < 0 while dw/dz < > 0. Moreover, dN/dα = 0, dw/dα > 0 or a fall in relative union power leaves employment intact (although the firm's share of rent rises) while reducing the wage. 9 0 and dY J /dp > 0. 10 Now, increased production, accompanying a positive price shock, is achieved through a rise in average hours. In this case, increased union utility is unequivocally achieved via an increase in the piece rate or the wage rate.
What if we allow changes in effort to affect individual and aggregate output (3) and (1), respectively)? Unsurprisingly, given the foregoing, it is not possible to find unambiguous employment, hours and earnings responses to price
shocks. An added complication is that both effort and hours appear in the production and worker disutility function of piecework and timework firms and, additionally, in the earnings function of piecework firms. These two intensive margin variables may act as complements or substitutes. In the latter case, for example, a decision to increase hourly effort may produce an offsetting leisure reaction, represented by a reduction in the number of weekly hours on the job. Gauging relative factor input and earnings responses in this case is renderred especially difficult. 
11 See the very useful discussion in Pencavel (1977) in relation to a highly related supply-side problem. 10 amount. Alternatively, consider an equivalent weekly earnings response but this time consisting of a positive hours effect with a partial offsetting reduction in effort. While weekly earnings changes are the same, by assumption, the rise in average hourly earnings in the first of these scenarios would exceed the rise in the second. In essence, unobserved effort may be associated with different hourly/weekly earnings responses.
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Remarks
Incorporating hours and effort into the definitions of production, utility and remuneration does not lead to clean-cut tractability in modelling outcomes.
Unambiguous employment and earnings responses require the imposition of rather stringent restrictions. Four points are worth stressing.
(a) In a union bargaining framework, where the union 'cares' about the employment of its members, it is not possible to establish systematic differences in the earnings responses of piece-and time-work firms to price, or productivity, shocks.
(b) Even if we assume that effort is independent of output changes, bargaining over employment and hours does not ensure unambiguous earnings responses.
(c) Retaining the effort assumption in (b) and holding employment fixed does produce positive earnings responses to price shocks. A reasonable inference follows from this result. Suppose that a positive price shock occurs during tight labor market conditions. For many firms, associated production increases are more likely to derive from increased intensive margin activity. Such changes, may well impact positively on earnings as firms reward longer hours and greater effort, including compensating employees for associated rises in work disutility.
(d) Especially in the case of pieceworkers, it is good practice to distinguish between hourly earnings and weekly earnings in empirical work since the relationship between effort and hours may be such as to render the responses of the two variables to differ for given price shocks.
Data and descriptive statistics
Data for this project, conditioned by the availability of district unemployment rates, cover the period from 1926 to 1938 and from 1951 to 1966.
13 Between 1926 and 1938 , the EEF represented between 1,800 and 2,200 firms employing between 260,000 and 560,000 adult manual workers (Wigham, 1973) . Between 1951 and 1966, there were between 4,000 and 4, 700 member firms employing between 1,000,000 and 1,161,000 manual workers. The EEF asked each of its member firms to conduct annual earnings enquiriesbased on company payrolls and during a specimen week 14 -separately for timeworkers and pieceworkers. Data on the two types of payment groups are available for 9 main occupations. 15 All are used in this study although several are further subdivided by skill 13 There are no wage and hours data for 1957 and 1963.
14 During the inter -war period the specimen week always occurred in October. In the post-war period, the data were recorded during March 1958, May 1952 and otherwise during one of the months from June to October.
level, giving 15 occupational groups in total (see Table 1 ). Pay data allow for the calculation of basic wage rates (i.e. excluding overtime) of hourly paid workers. Average hourly earnings, average weekly earnings as well as average weekly hours are available for both hourly paid workers and pieceworkers. All pay and occupational statistics are further broken down by EEF into over 50 engineering geographical districts, many of which are travel-to-work areas. This study makes use of 29 of these (see Table 1 ), for which exactly matched district male unemployment rates are available.
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During the study period, collective bargaining over pay and conditions was an important aspect of the British engineering industry. The dominant union was the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) but several smaller unions also negotiated on behalf of engineering workers. There is no direct information on the proportion of unionized workers in federated firms but it is safe to infer that they were significantly more unionized than firms in the (relatively highly unionized 17 ) industry as a whole.
Wigham ( The detailed payroll statistics on which estimation here is based were collected for the prime purpose of being of direct use in union negotiations. While national level bargaining was important -especially in respect of attempting to set minimum pay rates in key occupations -final agreed rates were strongly influenced at both district and company levels. 19 Piece rate pricing was complex and displayed considerable variation across this large and heterogeneous industry. Nonetheless, there were attempts at establishing relatively simple pricing guidelines. Based on a worker with 'average ability', national agreements established a percentage mark-up that a pieceworker might be expected to earn compared with the basic time rate within the same occupation.
Generally, however, such rules provided no more than weakly enforced guidelines. Piece rate/time rate differentials varied substantially within firms, across firms and through time.
"Owing to the immense number of different processes and operations in so heterogeneous an industry, as well as to the rapidity of technical development, any general control over piece-work earnings can be no more than minimal…Pieceworkers'
18 In their detailed analysis of the 1953 EEF returns, Hill and Knowles (1956) show that while 50.7 percent of federated firms employed fewer than 100 workers they accounted for only 6.2 percent total employment. By contrast, the 1.8 percent of firms that employed over 3000 employees accounted for 27 percent of total employment.
19 There were national agreements that determined two key occupational rates -for fitters and laborers. These were used to establish relative wages for other occupations. But there were a multiplicity of districtand company-level deviations from these national rates in order to accommodate local market conditions. As stated by Knowles and Hill (1954) : "All rates fixed by national agreement are essentially minima, the national-agreed differentials may be disturbed or even inverted by firms paying more than the minima all round".
actual earnings depend…on a vast number of particular piecework prices and times.
These are settled by domestic bargaining and are subject to no national control except that implied by the application of the piecework percentage to the basic rate…" (Knowles and Hill, 1954, pp. 281 and 284) . Figure 2 where it can be seen that pieceworkers rose as a group from 51 percent in 1926 to a peak of 65 percent in 1948, maintained a plateau to 1958, and then declined to 55 percent in 1966. What about pay differentials between piece-rated and hourly-rated workers? To investigate this issue, I concentrate on hourly earnings. In common with all related studies, the differentials favor pieceworkers. Table 1 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 Percentage All districts (w eighted) London Bedfordshire Oldham Manchester 66 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1948 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1964 1965 1966 18 and 1938 before rising to 40 percent at the peak of the war activity in 1942. 20 The build up to war (starting in 1935) and the early war years almost certainly produced a greater emphasis towards incentive-based pay designed to elicit greater commitment and effort. 20 From 1914, piecework prices were fixed so that the average pieceworker could expect to earn about onethird more than the basic time rate. This was changed to one-quarter above the time rate in 1931. Other complicating factors -for example, interpreting the so-called National Bonus as applied to time and piece rates -are explained in Knowles and Hill (1954) . These authors also give some explanation as to why the differential declined after WWII. There is a well established market-led literature on why we would expect wage differentials in favor of piece rates to result from more able workers self-selecting into and enjoying higher earnings than timeworkers (Lazear, 1986; Brown, 1990) . Empircal studies tend to bear out these predictions (e.g. Pencavel, 1977; Seiler, 1984) . It is not clear the extent to which these national guidelines merely reflected the inevitability of these sorting tendencies or indicated wider considerations. It is certainly difficult to square the post-war narrowing of the differentials with this economics literature. 14 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1948 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1964 1965 Estimeated Table 1 -is also added. Over the Great Depression, the earnings differentials provide a very striking mirror image of the superimposed plot of unemployment. Average hourly earnings based on piece rates fell relative to their time rate equivalents during downturns in economic activity and rose during upturns. A steep decline in the differentials coupled with low aggregate unemployment rates are clearly the key post-war features.
Estimation methodology
Here, I evaluate the effects of separating piece rate and hourly paid workers in pay-unemployment relationships. For comparative purposes, following the majority of papers in the relevant literature, I begin by using a single national unemployment rate as a 20 measure of the cycle. I adopt the two-step estimation procedure of Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994) . This is designed to tackle the following problem. Unlike the wages data, the national unemployment rate does not differentiate among engineering districts and occupational groups. Across and within districts different occupations may share common components of variance that are not captured by the single unemployment rate.
This may serve to bias downwards the estimated unemployment standard errors (Moulton, 1986) .
To illustrate the methodology, take the hourly real earnings changes of pieceworkers (∆ log y P ) in occupation i, within district r, at time t. Then the step 1 estimating equation is given by This two step estimation procedure is also carried out separately with respect to timeworkers' real basic wage rate (w) and average hourly earnings changes (∆ log y H ) and to the pieceworkers' and timeworkers weekly average earnings (∆ log Y P and ∆ log Y H , respectively). Comparable weekly hours regressions (using ∆ log h) are also carried out.
As we have seen from Figure 1 , there are large variations in district unemployment rates and a natural extension of the foregoing is to disaggregate cyclical effects to this level (see also Devereux, 2001 ). We still need to make use of the two step method because within a given district different occupations may share common components of variance that are not captured by the district unemployment rates.
Again, illustrating with the case of pieceworkers, step 1 is given by where d rt denotes a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for district r at time t (over R districts and T time periods) and u irt is an error term.
In step 2, estimates of φ rt are regressed on the change in district unemployment rates (∆U rt ) plus district and time intercepts, that is
.
Again, OLS is used to estimate (11) and WLS to estimate (12). The latter is weighted by the number of individuals in each district at time t. Table 2 shows the national-and district-level second-stage estimates on the change in unemployment -i.e. regression equations (10) and (12) First, while the hourly earnings of both pieceworkers and timeworkers are procyclical, the former display significantly larger coefficients than the latter. For pieceworkers, a 1 point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 0.25 percent decrease in the hourly earnings. The comparable earnings reduction for timeworkers is 0.09. Second, the basic wage of hourly paid workers is acyclical.
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Results
Comparing wage and hourly earnings results for this group suggests that hours, and hence the fraction of premium (overtime) to total pay, are procyclical. The third finding confirms this expectation. The hours of both piece rate and hourly paid workers are found to be strongly procyclical and not significantly different. A one point increase in the rate of unemployment is associated with a 0.5 percent reduction in weekly hours.
Fourth, the importance of cyclical hours effects is confirmed, again for both types of workers, when weekly earnings replace hourly earnings. A one point increase in unemployment is associated with a 0.76 percent reduction in the weekly earnings of pieceworkers and a reduction of 0.63 percent for hourly paid workers, estimates that are not significantly different.
The results with respect to hourly paid workers in Table 2 Table 2 give some limited support in this direction too. Thus, using district unemployment rates, the average hourly earnings of pieceworkers display significantly larger procyclical effects than those of timeworkers. But, the estimated pieceworker coefficient of -0.25 is considerably smaller than Devereux's equivalent job stayers' result of -2.17.
I conjecture in Section 2, based on outcomes from restrictive modelling assumptions, that an increase in product price is likely to lead to greater positive earnings effects during generally tight labor market conditions. Over the pre-war period from1926
to 1938, very large employment fluctuations occurred in engineering around a high trend in unemployment. Union utility was strongly affected by changes in employed membership with accompanying earnings outcomes less certain. During the post-war recovery period, while there were both time and cross section unemployment variations, the underlying labor market was altogether tighter with far less dramatic employment swings. Under these conditions, it is likely that earnings fluctuations may have been more sensitive to demand changes. Table 3 presents separate results for the pre-and post-war periods, based on district-level unemployment rates. The pre-war results are not dissimilar from those for the full period shown in Table 2 . The wage of hourly paid workers is acyclical. Piece rate workers' hourly earnings are significantly more procyclical than hourly paid workers.
The weekly hours of both groups are highly procyclical and do not differ from one another. The hours fluctuations are clearly very important since both groups display significant and comparable earnings cyclicality.
In three important respects, the post-war period displays different outcomes.
First, the wage rate of hourly paid workers is now significantly procyclical. Second, the cyclicality of the hourly earnings of hourly paid workers is significantly more pronounced that the earlier period (a 10-fold increase). Third, hourly earnings estimates do not differ statistically between the two payment groups. As for hours and weekly earnings responses, results from the post-war period correspond reasonably closely with the pre-war and total-period findings. Hours and earnings responses are strongly procyclical for both groups of workers.
Conclusions
Since piece rate systems are geared to rewarding individuals' current output, it seems to be intuitively plausible that, compared to hourly pay, they should be more sensitive to cyclical fluctuations in productivity and product demand. The developments in Section 2 lead to the view that, in reality, it is very difficult to discern clear cut cyclical 27 earnings differences between the two payments methods. In fact, in terms of weekly earnings, the subsequent empirical analysis finds no differences in earnings responses between the two groups.
In general terms, the findings of this paper lend support to Devereux (2001) who argues that it is important to distinguish between different payments measures in studies of earnings cyclicality. As in Devereux's study, hourly earnings responses are found to be less pronounced that those of weekly earnings. Also, it is found in the inter-war period that the wage of hourly paid workers is acyclical, average hourly earnings are significantly though weakly procyclical, and weekly earnings are far more strongly procyclical. Even in the post-war period, where the wage rate is found to be procyclical, weekly earnings are more strongly procyclical than either the wage or hourly earnings.
An important explanation for these differences across measures derives from the underlying strong procyclical fluctuations in paid-for working time. Of course, we would expect more modest hours' responses in data sets that represent broader cross sections of occupations. Blue collar workers are especially prone to work paid overtime.
One further point is worth underlining. The findings here point to the possibility that cyclical earnings responses will differ according to the relative tightness of the labor market around which cyclical payment effects take place. Some background labor market motivation is presented via firm-union bargaining. Certainly, in the case of hourly paid workers, weak wage and hourly earnings responses in the inter-war perod contrast with much stronger outcomes in the post war period. In fact the latter are more in line with outcomes from studies using more recent time periods.
